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CONSPIRACY AND AIDING-ABETTING: DISCUSSING THE STRUCTURE OF
THE THEORIES AND RELATED PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL CAUSATION-

Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
I. INTRODUCTION

Dr. Michael Halberstam, a prominent Washington, D.C. physician' and author, 2 received multiple gunshot wounds when he sur3
prised a burglar in his home on the evening of December 5, 1980.
The doctor, described by his friends as a man of remarkable energy
and intensity, then attempted to drive himself to a nearby hospital
with his wife at his side. 4 Mortally wounded, he spotted his attacker
running on the street and succeeded in hitting and immobilizing the
man with his car. 5 One block from the hospital Dr. Halberstam lost
consciousness and his car collided into a tree. 6 Although his wife
managed to transport him to the hospital, he was pronounced dead a
few hours later. 7 The police eventually apprehended the disabled
murderer and identified him as a fugitive wanted by the FBI, Bernard
C. Welch, Jr.,' who had masterminded a string of burglaries which

Dr. Michael Halberstam received his undergraduate education at Harvard and later
graduated from Boston University Medical School. He had lived in the Washington area for 18
years and was 48 years of age at the time of his death. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1980, at A52, cols. 46.
As a physician, Dr. Halberstam maintained a private practice in medicine and cardiology.
Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982). afJ'd. 705 F.2d 472
(D.C. Cir. 1983). He served an estimated 1,200 patients in the Washington, D.C. area. 1d. In
addition to his private practice Dr. Halberstan served as "a diplomate of the American Board of
Internal Medicine, a clinical professor of medicine at George Washington University Medical
School, senior medical editor of Modern Medicine magazine, and a member of the Institute of
Medicine." N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1980, at A52, col. 6.
1 Michael Halberstam had completed two nonfiction books, The Pills of Your Life and A
Coronary Event, and a novel, The Wanting of Levine. He was in the midst of writing a second
novel at the time of his death. In addition, Dr. Halberstam had contributed medical articles to
various periodicals. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1980, at A24, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Dec. 7. 1980, at A52,
col. 4; Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982), aff'd. 705 F.2d
472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
3 N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1980, at A52, col. 1. The Times reported that Welch had fired five
shots, two of which struck Dr. Halberstam in the chest. He died while undergoing surgery for
those wounds. Id.
4 Id.

5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
' Id. Mr. Welch had escaped from the Clinton Correctional Facility at Dannemora, N.Y.
while serving a 10-year sentence for burglary. Prior to his incarceration at the Clinton facility,
Welch had served time for burglary and rape. Id.
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terrorized the Washington community for over five years." His criminal campaign, which netted more than $1,000,000 per year in its final
stages,10 ended with the death of one of the community's finest men. I
Slightly more than five years before the killing of Dr. Halberstam, Bernard C. Welch, Jr. first approached Linda S. Hamilton in a
Virginia parking lot and asked her for a date. 2 Although Miss Hamilton testified that at some point during that evening she became aware
that Welch was armed, she further testified that this was the only
occasion on which she ever saw him carry a gun. 13 Within a few weeks
4
the couple began living together in Hamilton's apartment.
At the time of their meeting, Linda Hamilton was employed by
the National Academy of Sciences as a secretary-compositor.15 Although Welch was unemployed then, as well as throughout the succeeding five years, he told Hamilton that he had investments in a
variety of real estate ventures, as well as in coins and jewelry. His
personal possessions, however, consisted only of a new Monte Carlo
automobile, clothing, a watch, pocket money, and a few gold coins. '7
Hamilton and Welch continued to live together until the date of
Welch's arrest,' 8 gradually upgrading their lifestyle by means of
Welch's increasing wealth. 9 By 1978 he had an annual income exceeding $1,000,000.20 In 1976 Welch and Hamilton began renting a
house in Falls Church, Virginia. 2' Two years later they purchased a
home in Minnesota for $102,000 and placed title to the property in
Linda Hamilton's name. 22 Subsequently, the couple built a home in

9 See id.
Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

10

i See id.
12 Id. at 474-75.
'1 Id. at 475. It would seem that Hamilton's knowledge as to whether Welch usually was
armed should have had a bearing on the issue of foreseeability. See infJra notes 254-62 and

accompanying text.

Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
I5 Id. Linda S. Hamilton, 25 years old and a high school graduate, previously was employed
by the Department of Defense and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Halberstam v.
Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982), ajfd, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
"I Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982), aff'd, 705 F.2d
472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
", Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
14

Is

Id.

19 Complementing an expensive home were two 1980 Mercedes Benz automobiles and a
station wagon. The couple also hired a housekeeper. ld.
20 Id.
21

Id.

22 Id. Hamilton's father contributed $10,000 toward the purchase price, Hamilton contrib-

uted $20,000, Welch contributed $55,000 in cash, and a $17,000 mortgage was obtained to cover
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Great Falls, Virginia valued at $1,000,000.23 They lived in Great Falls
until the murder of Dr. Halberstam. 4
In furtherance of his business, Welch installed a smelting furnace
in the garage of his Great Falls home where he melted gold and silver
into bars. 25 His daily routine consisted of planning and managing his
investments at home. 26 Frequently, during the week, he would leave
the house at approximately 5:00 p.m. and return within four or five
hours. 27 Since Hamilton assumed that Welch was meeting with business associates and tending to his investments, his activities did not
seem particularly unusual to her. 28 She acted as his secretary and
bookkeeper,2 9 typing letters of correspondence and preparing invoices
for buyers of gold and silver. 30 She also kept records pertaining to the
sale of antiques, 3' and various other transactions with galleries and
dealers. 32 All checks and payments were deposited in bank accounts in
her name. 33 For tax purposes Hamilton reported significant gross
earnings in 1978 and 1979.34 She took deductions for "cost of goods
sold," although it was not clear that she knew whether any consider35
ation had in fact been paid for these goods.
After apprehending Welch, but prior to executing a search warrant, the police went to the Great Falls house. 36 Hamilton was cooper37
ative and voluntarily permitted the officers to enter and to search.

the balance. Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982), aJJ'd, 705
F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
23 Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 475 (DC. Cir. 1983).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. Hamilton never accompanied Welch on any of his evening business engagements, nor
did she have detailed discussions with him concerning his whereabouts. In fact, she testified that
she remembered only a single instance when she attended a meeting with Welch. This meeting
took place in Minnesota at a coin dealer's shop. Id.
Id.
30 Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982), aJf'd, 705 F.2d
29

472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
"' Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
32 Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982), aJf'd, 705 F.2d
472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
11 Id. at 4.
11 Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Hamilton's tax returns for 1978
and 1979 indicated gross earnings of $647,569.21 and $491,762.16, respectively. Id.
31 Id. at 475-76. The corresponding deductions for "cost of goods sold and/or operations" in
1978 and 1979 were for $498,770.87 and $360,000, respectively. Id.
36 Id. at 476 n.4.
37

Id.
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Forty-six boxes of contraband were later recovered from the basement. 3 When confronted, Hamilton contended that she rarely went
into the basement and had never seen any of the nearly 3,000 stolen
items within those boxes. 3° Throughout the entire legal ordeal, Linda
Hamilton maintained that she had no knowledge whatsoever that
Welch was a professional burglar. 40
Dr. Halberstam's widow, Elliott Jones Halberstam, brought suit
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 4 1
alleging, inter alia,41 that Hamilton was civilly liable for the death of
Dr. Halberstam. 43 In a nonjury trial, the district court agreed that
Hamilton was liable for the murder of Dr. Halberstam as a "joint
venturer" 44 and as a "co-conspirator." 45 The court set damages at
$5,715,188.05.46
Hamilton appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. 47 In Halberstam v. Welch, 4 Circuit

38 Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982), aff'd, 705 F.2d
472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
11 Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
40 See Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982), aJf'd, 705
F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Three police officers testified in Hamilton's defense. Halberstam v.
Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 476 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In their judgment, Hamilton did not have
knowledge of Welch's activity as a burglar. Their opinions were based on Hamilton's conduct
during the investigation which followed Halberstam's death. Id.
11 Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (subject-matter jurisdiction
based upon diversity of citizenship).
42 A civil action also was brought against Welch. He defaulted and judgment was entered
against him on May 19, 1981. Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 24,
1982), aff'd, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
43 See id. at 1-2. The action was brought seeking damages on behalf of the estate of Michael
Halberstam, and individually on behalf of Elliott Halberstam, Charles Halberstam, and Eben
Halberstam. Charles and Eben, ages 20 and 19 respectively, were sons of Dr. Halberstam from a
previous marriage. Id. at 9, 11; N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1980, at A52, col. 6.
44 Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982), aJf'd, 705 F.2d
472 (D.C. Cir. 1983). For a discussion of the fluidity of the concept of a joint venture, see Payton
v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1035-36 (D. Mass. 1981).
45 Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982), afJ'd, 705 F.2d
472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
46 Id. at 16. The total damage figure of $5,715,188.05 was to be apportioned as follows:
$123,488.05 for Elliott Jones Halberstam; $41,200.00 for Charles Halberstam; $50,500.00 for
Eben Halberstam; $500,000.00 to the Estate of Michael Halberstam as compensation for pain
and suffering during the 15 minutes that Michael Halberstam retained consciousness; and
$5,000,000.00 in punitive damages awarded to the Estate of Michael Halberstam pursuant to the
District of Columbia survival statute, 12 D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-101 (1981). Id.
47 Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Hamilton appealed the issue
of her liability only; she allowed the district court's calculation of the damage figure to stand
unchallenged. Id. at 474 n.2.
48 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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Judge Wald held Hamilton vicariously liable under the theories of
civil conspiracy and aiding-abetting.49 Accordingly, the judgment of
50
the district court was affirmed.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORIES

A. Conspiracy
Conspiracy began as a specific substantive crime in early English
5
common law to correct abuses of the criminal procedure system. '
Although criminal conspiracy was first constricted to this narrow use,
in the seventeenth century the theory's scope of applicability was
extended to encompass all types of crime. 52 This extension was premised upon the belief that " '[t]he confederation of several persons to
effect any injurious object creat[ed] such a new and additional power
to cause injury . . .' " as to require a criminal sanction. 53 Despite its
restrictive origins, the doctrine of criminal conspiracy developed rapidly 54 and became significant as an implement to control labor organizations. 55 Its civil counterpart, however, developed more slowly. 56
Eventually, in the late nineteenth century, the courts expanded the
theory of civil conspiracy so as to effectuate the settling of trade and
57
labor disputes during the Industrial Revolution.
In modern American law, the theory of civil conspiracy is reflected by the principles embodied within subsection (a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876.58 Clause (a) states that one
may be subject to liability for the act of another if he acts "in concert

19 Id. at 485.
50

Id. at 489.

5' See generally Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393, 394-96 (1922) (explaining
emergence of conspiracy offense through statutes to correct "abuses of ancient criminal procedure").
52 Id. at 396-400.
53 Burdick, Conspiracyas a Crime and as a Tort, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 231 (1907) (quoting
Seventh Report of the Commissioners on Criminal Law in England (1843)).
54 T. LEWIS, WINFIELD ON TORT-A TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORT § 127, at 523-24 (6th ed.
1954); Note, Civil Action for "True Conspiracy," 33 TUL. L. REV. 410, 411 (1959).
'5 Note, Civil Conspiracy:A Substantive Tort?, 59 B.U.L. REV. 921, 923-24 (1979).
58 T. LEwIs, supra note 54, § 127, at 524.
57 Id.; see also Note, supra note 55.
5' See Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 669 (5th Cir. 1980) (acknowledging that clause (a) of
Restatement "embraces" civil conspiracy).
The Restatement provides in pertinent part:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he
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with the other or pursuant to a common design with him.- 59 Within
the meaning of the Restatement, when two or more persons act in
concert, their conduct is necessarily linked to a previously existing
agreement. 60 In early cases, courts incorporated the concept of concerted action within their definitions of conspiracy. 6 ' The United
States Supreme Court stated that "[cloncert of action is a conspiracy if
its object is unlawful or if the means used are unlawful." 62 "Concert of
action" is a broad phrase frequently used in connection with the
imposition of vicarious liability for "joint torts. "63 Civil conspiracy is a
more specific concept contained within the scope of the concert of
64
action theory.
As a "poorly defined [tort] ... highly susceptible to judicial
expansion, ' 6 civil conspiracy never emerged as a clear-cut doctrine.66
Much of the confusion surrounding the theory is a by-product of the
67
debate over whether civil conspiracy is a substantive tort in itself.
Some authorities maintain that the tortious act which causes damage

(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a design with
him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
59 RESTATEMENT, supra note 58.
6 See id., comment on clause (a) ("Parties are acting in concert when they act in accordance
with an agreement to cooperate in a particular line of conduct or to accomplish a particular
result."); see also Payton v. Abbott Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (D. Mass. 1981).
61 See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 327 (1921) (where object or means utilized are
unlawful, concert of action is conspiracy); National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders' Ass'n,
169 F. 259, 264 (2d Cir. 1909) (civil conspiracy is "combination of two or more persons to
accomplish by concerted action an unlawful or oppressive object: or a lawful object by unlawful
or oppressive means" (emphasis added)).
'2 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 327 (1921) (citing Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S.
197, 203 (1893)).
63 See generally W. PaOSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 46 (4th ed. 1971); Jackson,
Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEX. L. REV. 399 (1939) (recognizing distinction between
procedural joinder and substantive liability and analyzing imposition of liability); Prosser, Joint
Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413 (1937) (arising from failure to consider
separately procedural joinder of defendants from substantive liability of defendants for certain
result).
64 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, comment on clause (a). Compare Payton v. Abbott
Labs, 512 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (D. Mass. 1981) (stating elements of concert of action theory)
with Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 (D.S.C. 1981) (stating elements of civil
conspiracy).
65 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 732 (1966).
66 See generally Williamson, The Resulting Confusion from the Varied Development of Civil
Conspiracy, 23 GA. B.J. 548 (1961).
67 Note, supra note 55, at 921. See generally Hughes, The Tort of Conspiracy, 15
REV. 209 (1952); Williamson, supra note 66.
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is the essence of a civil conspiracy 68 and that the injured party has a
cause of action against the actor with or without proof of a conspiracy. 9 According to this argument, civil conspiracy is not a substantive
tort, but simply a means of establishing joint liability for a wrong
which is actually a tort in itself. 70 The authorities holding that civil
conspiracy exists as an independent tort, however, consider the combination and agreement between two or more persons to be the essence
of the action. 7 ' To confuse matters even further, adherents to the
former view frequently recognize an exception to the rule that no
72
action for conspiracy will lie unless it is based on an underlying tort.
This exception furnishes a cause of action when a combination of
73
persons exercises a "peculiar power of coercion" over the plaintiff.
Recently, courts have attempted to clarify the theory by expressly
listing the essential elements that a plaintiff must establish before
recovering in an action for civil conspiracy.7 4 According to the District

18Note, supra note 54, at 412 ("[T]he weight of authority makes the gist of the action the
tortious activity which causes damage and not the act of conspiracy."); Note, Civil Conspiracy
and Interference with Contractual Relations, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 302, 306-07 (1975) ("[lit is
almost universally accepted that the essence of an action for civil conspiracy is not the combination but the acts and damage resulting therefrom."); see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Hoek, 38 N.J.
213, 238, 183 A.2d 633, 646 (1962), quoted in Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 276, 300 A.2d 563,
568 (1973).
11 See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Hoek, 38 N.J. 213, 238, 183 A.2d 633, 646 (1962), quoted in
Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 276, 300 A.2d 563, 568 (1973). See generally T. COOLEY, A
TRAsTISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 142-44 (2d ed. 1888); Note, Splitting Real Estate Broker's

Commissions, 12 FOROHAM L. REv. 277, 279 (1943) ("In civil suits.., the general rule [is] that a
conspiracy cannot be made the subject of a civil action unless something is done which, without
the conspiracy, would have given a right of action.").
70 Board of Educ. v. Hoek, 38 N.J. 213, 238, 183 A.2d 633, 646 (1962); see W. PaossER,
supra note 63, § 46, at 293 ("The gist of the action is not the conspiracy charged, but the tort
working damage to the plaintiff." (footnote omitted)).
71Williamson, supra note 66, at 549-50; see, e.g., Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 142
(D.C. Cir.) ("The essence of conspiracy is an agreement-together with an overt act-to do an
unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner."), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643 (1938).
72 Williamson, supra note 66, at 550. This exception often is referred to as the "force of
numbers" exception. Note, supra note 55, at 937-40.
73 Williamson, supra note 66, at 550; Note, supra note 55, at 937-40; DesLauries v. Shea,
300 Mass. 30, 33, 13 N.E.2d 932, 935 (1938) ("no independent tort for conspiracy unless . . .
Imere force of numbers acting in unison or other exceptional circumstances...' - (quoting
Caverno v. Fellows, 286 Mass. 440, 444, 190 N.E. 739, 740 (1934))). The DesLauries court
stated that "to prove an independent tort for conspiracy upon the basis of 'mere force of numbers
acting in unison,' it must be shown that there was some 'peculiar power of coercion . . .
possessed by the defendants in combination....' " Id. (quoting Cummings v. Harrington, 278
Mass. 527, 530, 180 N.E. 519, 520 (1932) (emphasis added)).
74 See, e.g., Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477; Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1012
(D.S.C. 1981).
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of Columbia Circuit, a contemporary list of the elements of civil
conspiracy includes:
(1) an agreement between two or more persons; (2) to participate
in an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful manner; (3) an
injury caused by an unlawful overt act performed by one of the
parties to the agreement; (4) which overt act was done pursuant to
75
and in furtherance of the common scheme.

It is frequently stated that the purpose or object of a civil conspiracy must be " 'to commit an unlawful act, or to commit a lawful act
by unlawful means.' "76 In this context it is clear that "unlawful" does
not mean criminal; thus, an act which is not a crime but which is
morally wrongful may be considered unlawful for the purposes of civil
conspiracy. 7 7 In addition, the coercive power of several persons acting
78
together may change the character of an otherwise lawful act.
Civil conspiracy also requires that an overt act performed in
79
pursuance of a conspiracy cause actual damage to the plaintiff. If
certain individuals have agreed to an unlawful plot, yet no injury has
occurred, a complainant has no cause of action for civil conspiracy. 80

75 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477; accord Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1012
(D.S.C. 1981).
7" Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 620 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting Rotermund v. United
States Steel Corp., 474 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1973) (citation omitted)), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980); see Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 51, at 405 (crediting Lord
Denman with origination of phrase).
" See Bull v. Logetronics, Inc., 323 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Va. 1971):
Although a civil conspiracy may consist of concerted action to accomplish 'an
unlawful or oppressive object, or a lawful object by unlawful or oppressive means'
the use of the word 'unlawful' does not necessarily connote criminal. 'Unlawful,
means without authority of law; that which is not justified or warranted by law. It
does not necessarily mean contrary to some statute or to the common law, but means
'unauthorized by law;' it does not necessarily mean contrary to law, but means not
authorized by law or the infringement of the moral law and not necessarily of the
civil law.
Id. at 134 (citations omitted).
78 For example, one anesthesiologist may rightfully refuse to work with a particular surgeon.
If all of the anesthesiologists in a hospital, however, agree to do likewise, with the distinct
purpose of driving that surgeon out of the medical profession, then the act becomes unlawful.
Margolin v. Morton F. Plant Hosp. Ass'n, 342 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Compare
id. with Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc., 105 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1958) (racetrack owners
conspiring to destroy plaintiff financially by refusing to allow plaintiff to race greyhounds on
their tracks). Similarly, if a group of employers agree to deny employment to several individuals,
thus depriving them of their livelihood, such conduct is unlawful. Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai,
Inc., 353 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1977).
19 Sullivan v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 611 F.2d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1979); see injra
note 80.
80 Blackwelder v. Millman, 522 F.2d 766, 775 (4th Cir. 1975).

1984]

NOTES

635

This feature distinguishes civil from criminal conspiracy. At common
law an individual was guilty of criminal conspiracy as soon as he
entered into an agreement to accomplish an unlawful object .8 Although several jurisdictions have statutorily added the requirement
that an overt act be committed in pursuance of the conspiracy before a
criminal conviction can be sustained, 82 damage is generally not required in criminal conspiracy.8 3 Nevertheless, it remains a prerequi84
site to a finding of civil liability.
The agreement in any conspiracy may be implied rather than
express: 85 a "tacit understanding" is sufficient.8 6 Like all agreements, a
conspiratorial agreement has no physical presence but exists only in
the minds of the conspirators. Therefore, in the absence of a confession, it usually is necessary to prove the existence of such an agreement
7
through reasonable inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.
When the injurious act is not committed by the alleged conspirators together, at the same time and place, the presence of an agreement may be more difficult to infer."8 A case exemplifying the use of
inferential reasoning is Peterson v. Cruickshank,8 1 in which Cruickshank was accused of conspiring with Peterson's psychiatrist, Dr.

"[I]t is not essential to criminal liability for conspiracy that the object of the conspiracy should have been accomplished. Civil liability rests on different grounds, however, and, unless actual damage has resulted from something done by one or more of
the conspirators in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy, no civil action lies
against anyone .. ."
Id. (quoting 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 6 (1967)); Krum v. Sheppard, 255 F. Supp. 994, 998
(W.D. Mich. 1966) ("[T]he cause of action does not result from the conspiracy, but from the
wrongful acts causing damage which were done in furtherance of the conspiracy."), aJJ'd, 407
F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1967).
Si Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 945-46 (1959).
52

Id.; see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(5) (1962).

s See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (1962).
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 649 F.2d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Unlike its criminal counterpart, a civil
conspiracy . .. requires [an] independently wrongful act and resulting damages.").
85W. PROSSER, supra note 63, at 292.
" Id. Prosser illustrates the idea of a tacit understanding by an example in which "two
automobile drivers suddenly and without consultation decide to race their cars on the public
highway." Id. (footnote omitted).
87 See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 481; Fisher v. Shamburg, 624 F.2d 156, 162 (10th Cir. 1980)
("Direct evidence of a conspiracy is rarely available, and the existence of a conspiracy must
usually be inferred from the circumstances."). For instance, if two minors are in the process of
burglarizing a commercial building, while an accomplice waits outside in a pickup truck with
the engine running, it may be reasonable to infer from these circumstances that the three agreed
to burglarize the establishment. Davidson v. Simmons, 203 Neb. 804, 280 N.W.2d 645 (1979).
8 See, e.g., Peterson v. Cruickshank, 144 Cal. App. 2d 148, 300 P.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1956).
89 Id.
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Francis, to falsely imprison Peterson in a sanitarium. 90 In determining
whether to uphold the jury's finding of liability, the court reexamined
the evidence:91 violent arguments along with the dissolution of a
romantic relationship provided Cruickshank with a motive; 92 Cruickshank and Francis had conversed on two separate occasions while
Peterson was confined; 93 after the second conversation another staff
member had induced Peterson to consent to shock treatments;9 4 and
Cruickshank had paid all the bills for Peterson's maintenance and
treatment. 95 The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
support an implied finding that Cruickshank had conspired to detain
96
Peterson in the sanitarium against her will.
Once a conspiracy is proven, each member of the conspiracy is
liable for any act done by any other member, so long as that act is
done pursuant to or in furtherance of the common design. 97 A conspirator's lack of knowledge regarding exact details of the common plan
does not preclude the imposition of liability: 98 It is sufficient if he is
aware of the general scope of the agreement. 99 In addition, a conspirator need not have knowledge that a particular act is being committed; 0 0 he may be held liable for an independent act by any conspirator in pursuance of the common design. 101

90

Id. at 150, 300 P.2d at 917-18.

1' Id. at 150-62, 300 P.2d at 918-25. Peterson did not contend that the defendants in fact had
conspired. Id. at 166-67, 300 P.2d at 928. The complaint alleged that the defendants were guilty
of false imprisonment on the theory that they were joint tortfeasors. Instructions were given to
the jury on joint tort liability and conspiracy. In this appeal, the court addressed the question of
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the implied finding of the jury that Cruickshank
had conspired or encouraged and participated in the false imprisonment. Id. (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 151-53, 166, 300 P.2d at 918-19, 927.
93 Id. at 165, 300 P.2d at 927.
14 Id. at 160, 300 P.2d at 924.
15 Id. at 161, 300 P.2d at 924-25.
96 Id. at 166-67, 300 P.2d at 928; see supra note 91.
17 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 481; Cruickshank, 144 Cal. App. 2d at 168, 300 P.2d at 929 ("It
is well settled that a conspirator is liable for all the acts done in furtherance of a common scheme
or plan even though he is not a direct actor."); cf. Taxin v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 287 F.2d 448,
451 (3d Cir. 1961) (quoting Nomand v. Universal Film Exch., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 469, 475 (D.
Mass. 1947) (defining limits of conspirator's responsibility for acts of co-conspirator), aff'd, 172
F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 967 (1949)), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 930 (1961).
18 Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 621 (7th Cir. 1979) (citing Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.
v. Greenberg, 447 F.2d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1971)), rev'd in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754
(1980).
99 Id.
0 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 481; El Ranco, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 406 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 875 (1969).
"o El Ranco, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 406 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
875 (1969). For example, if two minors, armed with pistols, conspire to burglarize a school
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B. Aiding-Abetting
In contrast to conspiracy, the theory of aiding-abetting can be
operative in the absence of an agreement between tortfeasors.10 2 Aiding-abetting is comprised of three elements: (1) "the party whom the
0 3
defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury;"'
(2) "the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an
overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the
assistance;' 0 4 and (3) "the defendant must knowingly and substan05
tially assist the principal violation."'
The concept of "substantial assistance" is the most significant
element and the most difficult to define. 0 6 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts lists five factors to be considered when determining whether
the degree of the defendant's participation is substantial:10 7 "the nature of the act encouraged, the amount of assistance given by the
defendant, his presence or absence at the time of the tort, his relation
to the other and his state of mind . ."108
Aiding-abetting cases may be divided into two separate classes.1 09
"Pure" aiding-abetting cases may be distinguished from those cases in
which an aiding-abetting theory was utilized, although a civil conspiracy theory seems equally applicable.' 10 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 876(b) specifically indicates that encouragement may
qualify as a means of assistance."' In a recent case of the "pure"
variety, a person who verbally encouraged another to batter a plaintiff by shouting "Kill him!" and "Hit him more!," was found liable to

building, and one of them independently shoots an investigating officer, the other minor is
equally liable for the officer's injury. Tabb v. Norred, 277 So. 2d 223 (La. Ct. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 279 So. 2d 694 (La. 1973).
102 See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477.
103 Id.
104 Id.; Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975); cf. Landy v. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973) (transforming Restatement oJ Torts §
876(b) into three elements required for liability), cert. denied. 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
"05Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477.
106 See generally id. at 483-84.
1"7 RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, comment on clause (b).
o8 Id.
100 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 481.
110 Id.; see, e.g., Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
The sale of a professional model's picture to a party, who later alters the picture and libels the
model, was considered substantial assistance. Id. Civil conspiracy never was mentioned, although the inference of an agreement between the defendants was a distinct possibility.
" See supra note 58; see, e.g., Rael v. Cadena, 93 N.M. 684, 604 P.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1979)
(verbal encouragement held to constitute substantial assistance in battery).
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that plaintiff. 112 It was not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the
encouragement actually had caused the battery. 1 3 Suggestive words
of less imminent force also may qualify as substantial assistance if they
are spoken by a person in a position of authority. 114
Physical acts of assistance also may form the basis of legal responsibility." 5 In Keel v. Hainline,"'0 the plaintiff, a female student, lost
the use of an eye when she was struck by a wooden blackboard
eraser." 7 Defendant Keel's activity was apparently limited to retrieving erasers and handing them to classmates who were throwing them
at one another during classroom "horseplay.""I8 The Keel court found
that the defendant had "aided and abetted" the wrongful acts of his
classmates by "procuring and supplying . . . the articles to be
thrown.""' Accordingly, Keel was held liable for the plaintiff's injury.

12

0

Although a person's presence at the scene of a tort is a factor to be
considered in the determination of substantial assistance,' 2' mere presence alone usually is not enough to impose liability. 122 The generally
accepted rule is that "silent approbation or pleasure in an assault and
battery inflicted by another does not make a person, who has not
23
encouraged or aided the perpetrator, liable in damages therefor.'1

Rael v. Cadena, 93 N.M. 684, 604 P.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1979).
13 Id.
114 See, e.g., Cobb v. Indian Springs, Inc., 258 Ark. 9, 522 S.W.2d 383 (1975).
A security
guard's position of authority was considered a factor which influenced a youngster to take his
new automobile for a high speed test run. Id. at 17, 522 S.W.2d at 387-88. The court used a "but
for" causal analysis to determine the substantiality of the security guard's assistance in an injury
which resulted from the test run. See id.
112

15
1

Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 482.
331 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1958).

Id. at 399.
Id. at 400.
"Q Id.
120 Id. at 401.
"i

Is

121

122

See supra note 110 and text accompanying note 111.
W. PRossER, supra note 63, at 292; see, e.g., Duke v. Feldman, 245 Md. 454, 459, 226

A.2d 345, 348 (1967).
123 Duke v. Feldman, 245 Md. 454, 457-58, 226 A.2d 345, 347 (1967) (citing 6 AM. JuR. 2D
Assault and Battery § 128 (1964)).
In certain areas, however, there has been much debate on whether silence and inaction can
amount to substantial assistance. As the Halberstam court noted, aiding-abetting frequently is
employed in securities law to establish secondary liability for principal violations of rule lOb-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 485.
The question of whether silence and the omission to act can amount to substantial assistance
in a securities fraud has led to differing opinions among the circuit courts. See, e.g., Woodward
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On the other hand, a defendant may aid and abet a wrongful act even
though he is absent at the time of the tort.' 24 Moreover, substantial
assistance does not imply concurrence with the act assisted.' 2 5 Temporal disjunction of the aider-abettor's conduct with the underlying act
of the principal tortfeasor does not preclude the conclusion that substantial assistance was rendered.1 2 6
Once the elements of aiding-abetting have been established, liability may extend beyond the damage caused by the primary wrong
which the aider-abettor substantially assisted.'2 7 He may be held liable for an additional act committed by the principal wrongdoer which
is done in connection with the act assisted,' 2 8 as long as that additional
act is reasonably foreseeable. 121
III.

THE HALBERSTAM ANALYSIS

In reviewing the district court's decision, the Halberstam court 3 °
examined the lower court's findings of fact and factual inferences
under the "clearly erroneous" standard.13 ' In particular the court of

v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975) (adopting hybrid test: if no duty to act, aiderabettor liable for silence and inaction only if "conscious intent" to assist in principal violation; if
duty exists, some lesser degree of scienter will suffice); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1317 (6th
Cir. 1974) (suggesting rule requiring "silence of the accused aider and abettor [to be] consciously
intended to aid the securities law violation"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Strong v.
France, 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding silence and inaction could give rise to liability
only when duty to act had arisen); Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 161-62
(3d Cir. 1973) (rejecting contention that mere inaction could amount to substantial assistance),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). See generally Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 96-97
(5th Cir. 1975) (discussing varying judicial standards used to measure culpability by silence).
124 See, e.g., Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
125 See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 482.
126 See id.; Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1954); see
supra note 110.
127 See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 483 (quoting American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grim, 201
Kan. 340, 346, 440 P.2d 621, 626 (19 68)).
128 Id.; accord RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, comment on clause (b) ("[A]lthough a person
who encourages another to commit a tortious act may be responsibile for other acts by the other,
• . . ordinarily he is not liabile for other acts that, although done in connection with the intended
tortious act, were not foreseeable by him."); see, e.g., American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grim,
201 Kan. 340, 440 P.2d 621 (1968) (minor assisting illegal entry into church held liable for
accomplices' burning of building).
12' Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 483. Compare, e.g., inira note 257, illustration 10 (foreseeable
additional act by principal wrongdoer) with infra note 257, illustration 11 (unforeseeable
additional act by principal wrongdoer).
130 The Halberstam court consisted of a three judge panel including Circuit Judges Wald,
Bork, and Scalia. The opinion for the court was filed by Circuit Judge Wald. Halberstam, 705
F.2d at 474.
3I See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of
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appeals reexamined three inferences which it considered "essential to
establishing the elements of civil conspiracy and aiding-abetting in
[the] case": 3 2 Hamilton's knowledge, the presence of an agreement,
and knowing assistance. 33 With respect to Hamilton's knowledge, the
court found that, given certain undisputed facts, 3 4 "it defie[d] credu35
lity that Hamilton did not know that something illegal was afoot."'
Thus, in the analysis of the court of appeals, the district court's
inference that Hamilton knew of Welch's criminal activities was per36
missible. 1
Second, the court found that Hamilton and Welch had "pursu[ed] the same object by different but related means."'1 37 The inference that an agreement existed was supported by Hamilton's involve1
ment as recordkeeper and secretary of the criminal enterprise. 3
Moreover, Hamilton's "unquestioning accession of wealth during this
period [was] certainly consistent with such an agreement.' 3 The
court placed special emphasis on the long duration of the relationship
between Hamilton and Welch, and termed this element "crucial to
'
the inference of agreement. 140
The Halberstam court completed its factual review by concluding that the district court's inference that Hamilton had knowingly
assisted Welch in his illegal activity also withstood scrutiny under the

the witnesses."); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) (finding
"clearly erroneous" only when appellate court left with "definite and firm conviction" that
mistake committed). " '[The clearly erroneous rule] is applicable to all classes of findings in cases
tried without a jury whether the finding is of a fact concerning which there was conflict of
testimony, or of a fact deduced or inferred from uncontradicted testimony.' " Halberstam, 705
F.2d at 486 n.16 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 52 (a) advisory committee note).
132Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 486.
133Id.

See id. These undisputed facts included:
Welch's pattern of unaccompanied evening jaunts over five years, his boxes of booty,
the smelting of gold and silver, the sudden influx of great wealth, the filtering of all
transactions through Hamilton except payouts for goods, Hamilton's collusive and
unsubstantiated treatment of ... her tax forms, [and] her protestations at trial that
she knew absolutely nothing about Welch's wrongdoing.
Id. (emphasis in original).
'3"

135Id.
136

Id.

131 Id.

at 487. Their activities were termed "symbiotic." Id.
district court stated that Hamilton's "role as the banker, bookkeeper, recordkeeper
and secretary [was] ample to sustain an inference of her agreement to join in the conspiracy."
Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982), af'd, 705 F.2d 472
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
'35 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487.
1 See id. ("Hamilton's knowledge and aid over five years makes some kind of accord
extremely likely .. ").
131 The
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clearly erroneous standard.' 4 1 In the court's view, Hamilton's clerical
and financial management services were extremely valuable to
Welch, and her acquiescence in putting title to many of the properties
in her own name helped to "launder the loot and divert attention from
Welch."''

42

In addition to finding that the facts supported the infer-

ences below, the court deferred to the district court's consideration of
43
Hamilton's demeanor and behavior under oath.
Continuing its analysis, the court determined that the foregoing
factual inferences supported the conclusion that Hamilton was a coconspirator. 44 The requisite agreement to do an unlawful act was
satisfied by the inference of an agreement between Hamilton and
Welch "to acquire stolen property. 4 5 The damage requirement
clearly was fulfilled by the murder of Dr. Halberstam.146 The only
remaining question was whether the murder was an overt act done
pursuant to and in furtherance of the common scheme. 14 Since Welch
shot Halberstam during a burglary in an attempt to escape apprehension, the court concluded that such conduct was "certainly not outside
the scope of [the] conspiracy. "148 In so finding, the court noted that it
was not necessary for Hamilton to have known about the murder
ahead of time. 49 In fact, the court found that the murder of Halberstam was a "reasonably foreseeable consequence" of the illegal plan. 5 0
"'

"I'See id. The district court did not utilize an aiding-abetting theory because such a theory
was not expressly recognized in District of Columbia tort law. See inira notes 152-55 and
accompanying text. The inference of knowing assistance to which the circuit court referred was
made in the context of a civil conspiracy discussion. See Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip
op. at 6 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982), affd, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The District Court
inferred that "Hamilton had guilty knowledge and knowingly and willingly assisted in Welch's
burglary enterprise from which she greatly benefited." Id.
142 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487. Specifically, the court held the inference valid in light
of
Hamilton's "typing transmittal letters for the ingot sales, handling the payments and accounts,
maintaining all financial transactions solely in her name." Id. at 486.
143 id.
14
Id. at 487. For a list of the elements of civil conspiracy, see supra text accompanying note
75.
"I Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487.
146 Id.
141 Id. Liability could be imposed if "the purpose of the act was to advance the overall object
of the conspiracy." Id.
141 Id. The court stated that "the use of violence to escape apprehension was certainly not
outside the scope of a conspiracy to obtain stolen goods through regular nighttime forays and
then to dispose of them." Id. (citing Davidson v. Simmons, 203 Neb. 804, 280 N.W.2d 645
(1979)).
149 See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487.
'50 Id. At the conclusion of their civil conspiracy analysis, the circuit court stated the following: "In sum, the district court's finding that Hamilton agreed to participate in an unlawful
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Thus, all elements being present, the circuit court agreed that Hamilton was liable for the death of Halberstam under a civil conspiracy
5
theory. 1'
Although the circuit court noted that aiding-abetting was not
recognized as a separate theory under District of Columbia tort
law, 152 it reasoned that the acceptance of civil conspiracy in the
District suggested that the underlying rationale of aiding-abetting also
would meet with approval. 153 The district court had concluded that
Hamilton was liable as a "joint venturer." 54 The circuit court believed, however, that the elements employed by the lower court to
determine liability manifested an implicit reliance on an aiding-abetting theory. 55 Therefore, the court went on to evaluate the imposition
of liability on the theory that Hamilton had aided and abetted
56
Welch. 1
Welch's killing of Halberstam provided a principal wrongdoer, a
wrongful act, and a resulting injury. 157 Thus, the first requirement of
the aiding-abetting theory was fulfilled. 58 With the acceptance of the
inferences that Hamilton knew that Welch was involved in an illicit
enterprise and that she had knowingly supported him, the circuit
court affirmed the finding that Hamilton had a general awareness of
her role in continuing an illegal activity. 59 Thus, in the opinion of the
inquiry was whether Hamilton's
court of appeals, the only remaining
60
assistance was "substantial.'1
The Halberstam court did not view the question as whether
16
Hamilton substantially assisted in the murder of Dr. Halberstam. 1
course of action and that Welch's murder oJ Halberstam was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the scheme are a sufficient basis for imposing tort liability on Hamilton according to
the law on civil conspiracy." Id. (emphasis added). The court failed to explain, however, the
relevance of foreseeability to the theory of civil conspiracy. See id.; see also infra notes 211-14
and accompanying text.
'5' Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487.
152 Id. at 479.
'5' See id. The court stated that the existence of a civil conspiracy action in the district
manifested an acceptance of the general principle that one who supports a wrong may be liable
for the tortious injury. As supporting a wrong through an agreement may create liability,
supporting a wrong through knowing substantial assistance should have the same effect. See id.
" Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982), aff'd. 705 F.2d
472 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487; see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
"5 See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487.
""
Id. at 487-89.
'57 See id. at 488.
58 See supra text accompanying notes 103-05. -[T]he party whom the defendant aids must
perform a wrongful act that causes an injury." Halberstarn, 705 F.2d at 477.
"I Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488; see supra note 104 and accompanying text.
0 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488.
"'lSee id. at 487-89.
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Rather, they framed the issue as whether Hamilton substantially assisted in the burglary enterprise. 162 To aid in its analysis of this issue,
63
the court relied on the five factors enunciated in the Restatement. 1
64
The court characterized the first factor, the nature of the act,1
as a "five-year-long burglary campaign against private homes."165 The

nature of this enterprise made it heavily dependent on transforming
the stolen goods into usable cash.166 According to the court, Hamilton's assistance was "indisputably important" because she had donated her time, talents, and her name to aid in this goal.1'6 The court
also stated, in a footnote, that a proportionality test could be used
under the " 'nature of the act' criterion."' 68 Under this test, even
though the actual amount of the defendant's assistance remains the
same, a court may consider that same assistance more "substantial" as
the seriousness of the underlying act increases.1 69 The Halberstam
court failed, however, to state whether this test played any part in
their decision.

7 0

Rather than isolating the amount of assistance17' in any single
burglary, the court considered the total worth of Hamilton's activities
over the entire five year period. 72 As a result, her activities emerged
as "an essential part of the pattern.' '

73

Although the court acknowl-

edged that Hamilton was not present 74 during any of the burglaries,
presence in itself was held not to be dispositive. '7 The court further
recognized that Hamilton's normal supportive duties as Welch's

162
163

Id.
Id. at 488; see supra text accompanying notes 107-08.

"I Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488.
65

Id.

Id.
17 Id. Hamilton donated her name by allowing payments for stolen merchandise to be
directed to her, by accumulating cash in her bank accounts, and by falsifying her tax returns.
The court recognized that these acts could be construed neutrally if taken alone, but emphasized
that the evaluation had to be made in the context of a "five-year-long burglary campaign against
private homes." Id.
66 Id. at 484 n.13.
169 See id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 249-50.
166

170

See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487-89.

The amount of assistance is the second factor to consider in determining substantiality as
recommended by the Restatement. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
12 See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488.
173 Id.
174 The defendant's presence or absence at the time of the tort is the third factor to consider in
determining the substantiality of assistance as recommended by the Restatement. See supra notes
107-08 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
171
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housem ate should not be held against her176 and, therefore, accorded79
78
77
Her state of mind,
minor significance to her relation to Welch.
however, was held to be of special significance.18 0 According to the
court, Hamilton's knowing and willing assistance manifested a "longterm intention" to participate in and benefit from a highly illegal
activity. 181
Finally, a sixth factor was introduced by the Halberstam court.
The duration of the assistancewas adopted as an additional consideration to be used in determining when an aider-abettor's assistance is
substantial. 182 The court acknowledged that this factor "strongly influenced" them to find substantiality in Hamilton's conduct. 18 3 In
defining the scope of her liability, the court found that the killing of
Halberstam was a natural and foreseeable result of the burglary enterprise. 84 Observing that specific knowledge of the burglaries on Hamilton's part was not necessary, the court concluded that it was sufficient that she knew Welch was involved in property crimes at night. 185
The court stated that both violence and death were foreseeable risks
whenever one commits such crimes. 816
The circuit court noted that a co-conspirator's liability extends to
acts done by the primary wrongdoer in pursuance of a common
design, 87 whereas an aider-abettor is liable for reasonably foreseeable
consequences of the acts he assists. 188 After raising this distinction,
however, the court found it unnecessary to evaluate the differences
between these two tests. 89 According to the court, Hamilton's liability
was an appropriate result under both tests.1 0

Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488.
The defendant's relation to the primary tortfeasor is the fourth factor to consider in
determining whether the defendant's assistance was substantial according to the Restatement.
See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
17

77

178

Id.

The defendant's state of mind is the fifth and final factor given by the Restatement to aid in
determining substantiality. Id.
Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488.
Io
171

1S Id.

Id. at 484. The court considered this supplement to the Restatement's list an important
"I
indicator of substantial assistance. Id.; see infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
'S3 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488.
"I See id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 See

supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
189Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484-85.
190Id.
188
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In conclusion, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized that the elements set forth for both civil conspiracy and
aiding-abetting were not "immutable components," but would undoubtedly be adapted to accommodate future factual situations.' 9'
Although precedent was scant,1 92 the court believed that "the implications of tort law in this area as a supplement to the criminal justice
process and possibly as a deterrent to criminal activity [could] not be
casually dismissed.' 93 This novel case was viewed by the court as a
"beginning probe into tort theories as they apply to newly emerging
notions of economic justice for victims of crime. "194
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. The Factual Conclusions
Civil conspiracy involves an intentional tort; 95 similarly, aidingabetting is an intentional tort by definition. 96 Under either theory the
plaintiff must prove the defendant's comprehension of the tortious
object. 97 Since this cognitive element relates to the subjective state of
the defendant's mind, it will most often be necessary for the plaintiff
to present circumstantial evidence from which this subjective state
may be inferred. 9 8
The inference that Hamilton knew the criminal nature of
Welch's activities was the cornerstone of the Halberstam decision, 99
See id. at 489.
92 Precedent in this area mainly is confined to securities law and the "isolated acts of

adolescents in rural society." Id.; see, e.g., supra note 123 (aiding-abetting in securities law);
Tabb v. Norred, 277 So. 2d 223 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (two minors burglarizing a school);
Davidson v. Simmons, 203 Neb. 804, 280 N.W.2d 645 (1979) (boy getaway driver held liable for
burglar's battery of investigating officer).
193 Halberstarn, 705 F.2d at 489.
194

Id.

Note, supro note 55, at 930. The intent in civil conspiracy originates in the agreement to do
something unlawful. See id. Upon entering the agreement, the conspirator exhibits that "intent
to bring about a result which will invade the interests of another in a vay that the law will not
sanction." See W. PRossa, supra note 63, at 31 (defining "'intent" for purposes of tort law).
986 Intent in aiding-abetting is assured by the requirements that the aider-abettor have knowledge of his role in a tortious activity and knowingly assist that activity. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05. It should be noted, however, that an aider-abettor may assist negligent
conduct. See RESTATEMENT, supra.note 58, comment on clause (b).
"I' See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
198The only exception to this statement arises when a defendant provides direct evidence by
confessing his thought processes. See supra note 87 (referring to proof of agreement in civil
conspiracy).
199 In the absence of knowledge, both theories collapse as viable bases for the imposition of
liability. With respect to civil conspiracy, there can be no agreement without a degree of
195
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but what led the trial judge to characterize this conclusion as "inescapable?-20 0 Arguably, every piece of evidence can be reconciled with
the following proposition: Hamilton had no knowledge of Welch's
activity; she believed he was a legitimately self-employed businessman
who worked his own hours, bought and sold a variety of goods, and
frequently stored them in his home; she trusted him; she was passive
and submissive in nature, and assisted in secretarial tasks at Welch's
direction. 2 0 Although the inferences made by the district court passed

knowledge of the object which the conspirators commonly seek. In aiding-abetting, knowledge is
an essential element of the theory. See supra text accompanying note 104.
10 Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1982), aff'd, 705 F.2d
472 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
From the foregoing findings of fact and from the demeanor and behavior of Hamilton under oath, the conclusion is inescapable that she knew full well the purpose of
[Welch's] evening forays and the means by which she and Welch had risen from
"rags to riches" in a relatively short period of time.
Id.
"Inescapable" is defined as "incapable of being avoided, ignored, or denied .. .following
of strict logical necessity or moral compulsion." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC'rioNARY OF TIlE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1156 (1963). The conclusion does not follow from
strict logical necessity. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
The Halberstam court implicitly held that the proposition that Hamilton had no knowledge of Welch's criminal activity "defies credulity." See HalberstanI. 705 F.2d at 486. The court
followed this statement with an enumeration of all the factors supporting the inference of
Hamilton's knowledge. Id. All of these factors can be reconciled with the absence of knowledge
and none are logically inconsistent: (1) Welch's early evening outings arguably can be explained
as business meetings. See supra text accompanying note 27. (2) The boxes of goods certainly are
not inconsistent with the type of business in which Welch claimed he was engaged. See supra text
accompanying note 16. (3) The smelting of gold and silver into bars is a perfectly legal activity
from which no culpable knowledge of illegal activity may necessarily be inferred. See 31 U.S.C.
§§ 325, 328 (1976). (4) The sudden influx of wealth will occur in any highly successful business
venture, regardless of whether that venture is legal or illegal. Certainly the influx of wealth
would more likely cause a wife to connect that wealth with her husband's commercial success,
rather than arouse a suspicion of illegal activity. (5) The fact that Welch used Hamilton's name
for monetary transactions would be culpable only if Hamilton's knowledge of illegal activity was
already established. Without prior knowledge, this fact could do little more than raise suspicion
in a very abstract manner. (6) The fact that Hamilton's tax forms were fraudulent was used to
support the conclusion that she knew that something illegal was transpiring. Halberstam, 705
F.2d at 486. This inference logically depends upon whether Hamilton completed the tax forms
knowing that the figures were fabricated. If she merely signed the forms or completed them in
reliance on Welch's instructions, then any inference of wrongdoing is untenable. A valid use of
the tax forms as an inculpatory device depends upon the assumption that Hamilton knowingly
took the deductions for "costs of goods sold" while aware that the goods actually had not been
purchased. (7) Hamilton's frequent protestations that she knew absolutely nothing about Welch's
burglaries were also held against her. Id.; Halberstam v. Welch, No. 81-0903, slip op. at 6
(D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1983), afJ'd, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The district court stated: "Her
consistent denial of knowledge of the criminal enterprise, when viewed in light of all of the
evidence, show[ed] an awareness of culpability and need to deny." Id. "The lady doth protest too
much, methinks." W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act III, Scene 2 (Rinehart & Co., 7th printing,
1957).
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scrutiny under the clearly erroneous standard, 20 2 they were far from
"inescapable. 2 0 3 The pejorative characterization of basic facts2 0 4 by
the circuit court did little to hide the fault in their inferential analy2 05

sis.

B. Civil Conspiracy: Legal Causation and Foreseeability
According to the contemporary theory of civil conspiracy, any
party to an unlawful agreement may be held civilly liable for an
injury which, although physically accomplished by a fellow conspirator, was nevertheless in furtherance of the common plan. 20 6 Thus, the
extent of vicarious liability may be stretched to cover any act which
arguably could prolong, promote, or aid in the procurance of the
20 7
object or the accomplishment of the goal sought by the conspirators.
By this logic, Hamilton was said to be civilly liable for the murder of
Dr. Halberstam. 20 8 Teleologically, the murder was an attempt by
Welch to escape apprehension, 20 9 and escape would have allowed
Welch to continue or prolong the "illegal enterprise to acquire stolen
property. "210
An illustration of the practical extent of liability in a civil conspiracy is provided by the following example in which A and B

The existence of Hamilton's knowledge was not as clear as the trial judge indicated. Three
police officers testified that they believed that Hamilton had no knowledge of Welch's activity.
See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 476 n.4. They based their opinion on observations of Hamilton's
behavior during the investigation. There was testimony as to Welch's skill as a "con artist." In
addition, Welch apparently duped another woman whom he had lived with before meeting
Hamilton. Id. Although the court offered the possible explanation that the police "did not realize
the full extent of Hamilton's involvement with Welch's operations" and that they "might have
had difficulty charging Hamilton because of jurisdictional restrictions." the failure of the state to
bring criminal charges against Hamilton indicates that the prosecutor may have doubted that
scienter could have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. (implying that criminal
charges were not initiated).
202 The absence of knowledge on the part of Hamilton was a real possibility. See supra note
201 and accompanying text. The clearly erroneous standard, however, requires the "firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364, 395 (1948), quoted in Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487. A possibility, or even a slim
probability, that the district court was wrong would not be enough to overturn their factual
findings. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTs 646 (4th ed. 1983).
203 See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 134.
205 See supra note 201.
206 See supra text accompanying notes 97-101.
207 See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487 ("[A] conspirator can be liable . . . so long as the purpose
of the act was to advance the overall object of the conspiracy.").
201 See id.
200 See id.
210 Id.
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conspire to steal C's briefcase. Both A and B realize that C constantly
watches his briefcase. Before the schemers have the opportunity to
fulfill their objective, B decides that it will be much easier to steal the
briefcase if he eliminates C altogether; thus, B kills C. Although B's
act was unknown to and unforeseen by A, under a literal construction
of the above theory, it is clear that A is liable for the death of C since
that event has furthered the object of the conspiracy. This simple
application exposes an interesting aspect of civil conspiracy that has
been largely ignored by courts and commentators:
The extent of
2 11
liability is not limited by foreseeability.
The Halberstam court recognized this subtle enigma when they
briefly acknowledged the difference in language between the tests for
the extent of liability in aiding-abetting and civil conspiracy. 21 2 After
noting that an aider-abettor's liability is restricted to reasonably foreseeable consequences, whereas a co-conspirator is liable for anything
in pursuance of the common plan, the court stated, "we are not sure
that [this] is a distinction that makes a practical difference. ' 213 They
concluded, "[w]e need not look further into this matter here, however, because we find below that Hamilton is liable for Halberstam's
death under the language of both tests. "214
Upon further inquiry, however, it becomes apparent that the
distinction can make a "practical difference." 21 5 As in the ABC examples above, an act which objectively furthers a common plan can
result in unforeseeable consequences. 2 16 The two conceptual categories are not mutually inclusive. Thus, a person becoming a party to an
unlawful agreement may be found liable for consequences of that
agreement which he did not contemplate and could not reasonably
foresee. The extension of tort liability to damages which result from
any act in pursuance of the common design of a conspiracy is nothing
more than an arbitrary test based on traditional rhetoric. It is inconsistent with the doctrine limiting the defendant's liability to the fore-

211

For a list of the elements necessary to impose liability under civil conspiracy, see supra text

accompanying note 75,
22 See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 485.
25 In the ABC example, liability for the death of C would be imposed on A under the "in
pursuance" test, but not under the "reasonably foreseeable" test (assuming the killing of C was a
reasonably unforeseeable act by B). See supra text accompanying note 211.
211 See supra note 215.
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seeable risks of his tortious conduct.2 17 Concomitantly, it establishes a
separate theory of proximate cause 21 8 which allows a plaintiff to suca defendant who could not otherwise be held legally
cessfully attack
21 9
responsible.
The overinclusiveness of the "in pursuance" standard allows a
tenuous relationship between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury to serve as the basis for civil conspiracy liability. This
tenuity is exacerbated by a prevailing judicial neglect of basic principles of legal causation in the application of civil conspiracy. This
neglect is manifested by a virtually universal failure to recognize the
existence of section 875 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section
875, the general rule on contributing tortfeasors, 22 0 governs section
876 which is cited repeatedly in justification for holding one defendant liable for the act of another. 22' In addition, section 875 requires
that the tortious conduct of a defendant be a legal cause of the harm
to the injured party. 222 This general rule is to be construed as "consist223
ent with . ..the rules of causation applicable to negligence cases.
Thus, a person's conduct must be a substantialfactorin causing harm
to the plaintiff before liability will be imposed. 224 Proper application
of this principle to the theory of civil conspiracy requires that a
defendant's conduct be a substantial factor in bringing about the
plaintiff's harm before he will be held liable for an act done by a coconspirator.
In effect, the civil conspiracy theory expounded by the Halberstam court creates an irrebuttable presumption that any conspirator
21 This doctrine originally was advanced to limit the extent of liability for a negligent
defendant. See W. PROSSER, supra note 63, at 251 (crediting Baron Pollock with origination of
concept). For a discussion on foreseeabilitv as a limitation on negligent conduct, see Green,
Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961); Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited,
52 MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1953).
21sSee McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149, 157 (1925) (setting out three
classes of proximate cause).
211 See T. COOLEY, supra note 69, at 144.
When the mischief is accomplished, the conspiracy becomes important . . . for the
party wronged may look beyond the actual participants in committing the injury,
and join with them as defendants all who conspired to accomplish it. The significance of the conspiracy consists, therefore, in this: That it gives the person injured a
remedy against parties not otherwise connected with the wrong.
Id.
220 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979).
22! See, e.g., Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477; Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 669 (5th Cir. 1980);

Rael v. Cadena, 93 N.M. 684, 604 P.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1979); Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc.
2d 166, 187, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8, 32 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
222 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1979).
223 Id., comment c.
224 See id.
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has legally caused an injury which results from the act of a fellow
conspirator, provided that act was done pursuant to and in furtherance of the common scheme. 225 Restated, the assumption is that an
agreement between two or more persons is invariably both a cause in
fact and a proximate cause when one of those persons acts and harms
a third person. 226 Under certain circumstances such a presumption
227
may be no more than fiction.
The Halberstam court implicitly found that Hamilton's conduct
was a proximate or legal cause of Dr. Halberstam's death. 22 1 This
presupposes that her conduct was also a cause in fact of the murder. 22 9
Even the overinclusive "but for" test would be strained to discover a
causal link between Hamilton's secretarial work and the shooting of
Halberstam. 230 Certainly Hamilton's conduct was not a sine qua non
of Welch's burglary enterprise. 23 1 Although she may have increased
the size of the operation, she hardly was instrumental in causing
2 32
Welch to engage in a burglary operation.
Civil conspiracy ignores causation in fact as a necessary element
of the plaintiff's case and extends liability to unforeseeable acts of a co-

225 Since proving causation is universally a part of the plaintiffs case, when liability is imposed
it is implicit that the plaintiff has met this burden. Since liability may be imposed when a
plaintiff satisfies the elements of civil conspiracy, causation must be subsumed within those
elements. Thus, if those elements are in fact satisfied, legal causation is irrebuttably presumed.
Legal causation, in this sense, includes factual causation and proximate causation.
226See supra note 225. Specifically, the element of agreement must contain the causal nexus
because it is the only element which connects all the conspirators to the plaintiffs injury.
527 This is most likely to be true when the defendant has done nothing substantial in pursuance
of the conspiracy and a co-conspirator independently formulates a plan, carries it through, and
injures the plaintiff. According to the Halberstam court, it is not necessary for the defendant to
have performed an overt act; it is sufficient if there was "an unlawful overt act performed by
[any] one of the parties to the agreement." Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 477; see supra text
accompanying note 75.
228 See supra note 225.
229 Proximate cause is essentially a question of law in which it is determined whether the

defendant is to be held legally responsible for an injury which he, in fact, has caused. W.
PRossEa, supra note 63, at 244; McLaughlin, supra note 218, at 155. Therefore, the question of
whether the defendant's conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiffs injury is necessarily a preproximate cause issue. Terry, ProximateConsequencesin the Law of Torts, 28 HARv. L. REV. 10,
16 (1914) ("It must appear that the cause has actually produced the consequence, or will actually
produce it, before the question of the proximateness of that consequence can be raised at all.");
cf. McLaughlin, supra note 218, at 156.
210Use of the "but for" test to establish factual causation in the Halberstam case involves the
question: But for Linda Hamilton's conduct, would the murder of Dr. Halberstam have occurred?
23 Aside from the fact that Welch was a convicted burglar who had escaped from prison, the
most convincing argument in favor of this assertion is that Welch already had begun to burglarize the community before Hamilton began her secretarial tasks.
232 See supra note 231.
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conspirator. By simply drawing the inference that it was more likely
than not that the defendant was a party to an unlawful agreement,
and that another conspirator acted in pursuance of the common
scheme, liability may ensue. This result allows compensatory and
punitive damages to be levied against a defendant who was not a
cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury.
When two or more persons agree to seek a particular goal, the
existence of an agreement does not preclude one of those persons from
independently embarking on a course of conduct which might have an
objectively favorable impact on the achievement of the previously
established goal. Moreover, the agreement does not automatically
become a cause in fact of every such independent act. Before one
person is held liable for the act of another, the plaintiff should be
required to show that the nonacting party legally caused the other
person to act and to injure the plaintiff. The present structure of the
civil conspiracy theory allows for a natural circumvention of this
causal issue by limiting the court's inquiry to certain defined elements.
For these reasons the theory of civil conspiracy should be either substantially altered to comply with principles of legal causation 23 3 or
234
discarded altogether.
C. Aiding-Abetting
Unlike civil conspiracy, the theory of aiding-abetting has an
inherent safeguard against abrogation of causal principles. That safeguard is the requirement that the aider-abettor substantially assist the
principal actor before the aider-abettor is vicariously liable as a contributing tortfeasor. 235 The substantial assistance requirement operates to ensure that the defendant satisfies the "substantial factor" test
in causing the plaintiff's injury.2 36 In addition, the extent of the aiderabettor's liability is limited to the reasonably foreseeable consequences
237
of the act he assists.
Despite the soundness of the theory, problems may arise in its
application. For example, ultimate liability may turn upon how one

See inJra text accompanying notes 264-67.
Cf. Hughes, supra note 67, at 209; Williamson, supra note 66.
235 See supra text accompanying note 105.
236 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 58, comment on clause (b)("If the encouragement or assistance is a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort, the one giving it is himself a tortfeasor
and is responsible for the consequences of the other's act.").
237 See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
233
234
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defines the "act" that the defendant allegedly assisted. 238 In Halberstam, the court deemed it appropriate to focus the inquiry on whether
Hamilton had substantially assisted in the burglary enterprise. 239 The
court then considered the murder as a foreseeable consequence of the
burglary enterprise.2 40 Rather than a consequence, however, the murder can be considered an act in itself. Why did the court refuse to
focus directly on whether Hamilton had aided and abetted the murder
of Dr. Halberstam? The answer becomes immediately obvious. Since
Hamilton had no knowledge of the killing, she could not fulfill the
element of knowing assistance. 24' Hence, she could not be held liable.
Even the five substantiality factors in the Restatement change their
when one asks if Hamilpersuasive character in favor of nonliability
242
ton substantially assisted in the murder.
Although the element of substantial assistance was intended to
ensure that the plaintiff prove causation, the vulnerability of the
phrase to subjective interpretation opens the door to judicial manipulation of the concept. The Restatement enumerates five presumably
illustrative 243 factors to aid in determining whether the defendant's
assistance was too slight to warrant liability. Each factor can be
construed differently; no single factor is dispositive. The Halberstam
court added a factor of its own, the duration of the assistance, and
gave it maximum weight to find substantiality. 244 Simply put, what is
substantial to one court may not be to another.
One factor which gives some idea as to what type of aid would be
substantial is the natureof the act criterion.2 45 At first glance, it seems
that secretarial work and "fencing" assistance would be of limited

2
If A assists B in act X, and B also accomplishes act Y, two possible approaches exist to
determine if A is liable for act Y: The inquiry may be (1) did A substantially assist in act Y?; or
(2) did A substantially assist in act X, and was act Y a reasonably foreseeable act in connection
with act X?
239 See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
240 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488.
241 See supra text accompanying note 105.
242 (1) The natureof the act becomes a murder. Thus, Hamilton's secretarial work, etc., seems
more insignificant; (2) the amount of assistance in the actual killing was nonexistent; (3)
Hamilton was not present at the time of the tort; (4) the relation of Hamilton to Welch remains
the same; and (5) Hamilton's state of mind would be exculpatory because she did not know of the
murder.
243 The Halberstam court implicitly presumes that the factors are illustrative rather than
exhaustive since they add an additional factor of their own. See soupra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.

244

Id.

245 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484.
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significance in the actual commission of a burglary. This conduct
seems even less substantial in conjunction with a murder. When the
act is defined as a burglary enterprise, however, that assistance becomes important in maintaining the scope of the operation. 246 The
Halberstam court considered Hamilton's conduct extremely important, seeming to imply that the very existence of the operation de247
pended on her involvement.
The court also mentioned that a "proportionality test" might be
used in conjunction with the nature of the act criterion. 248 Under this
test a static amount of assistance becomes more substantial as the
seriousness of the underlying act increases. 249 Such a test is logically
absurd. When the underlying act becomes more serious, the objective
materiality of a specific act of assistance does not increase proportionally. The substantiality of a particular act depends upon the quantitative and qualitative relationship between that act and the total cumulation of all causal factors which combine to produce the plaintiff's
injury.2 50 The severity of the injury itself is immaterial to an objective
determination of substantiality. The proportionality test reduces causation to a mere variable wholly dependent on a given court's view of
the seriousness of the wrong. As a breeder of inconsistency, this test
should be discarded.
The Halberstam court justified their addition of the duration of
the assistance factor by claiming that "[t]he length of time. . . almost
certainly effects [sic] the quality and extent of [the] relationship [between the aider-abettor and the principal actor] and probably influences the amount of aid provided as well; additionally, it may afford
evidence of the defendant's state of mind."'25' It seems clear that the
court added the duration of the assistance factor to reemphasize that
Hamilton had lived with Welch for five years. Implicitly, the suggestion is that five years of assistance is certainly substantial. The five
year time period, however, is technically incorrect, since Hamilton
did not know Welch was a burglar when they first met. The inference
of knowledge suggests that she discovered that fact at some unknown

248 See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
247 See id.
248

Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484 n.13.

248

Id.

250 But cf. Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 554

(1962) (" 'substantial' cannot be defined, further analyzed or broken down into lesser
terms.").
251 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484.
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time during their period of cohabitation. Thus, she could not have
"knowingly assisted" during the entire five years. In any event, the
time factor already had been given weight in calculating the amount
of aid 2 52 and in characterizing Hamilton's state of mind as a "deliberate long-term intention to participate in an ongoing illicit enterprise. ' 253 Thus, adding the duration of the assistance as a sixth factor
was totally unnecessary.
Once substantial assistance has been determined, the causal
nexus between the aider-abettor's behavior and the principal tortfeasor's act is sufficiently established. 254 The aider-abettor's liability
will extend to other reasonably foreseeable acts done in connection
with the tortious act he assisted, 255 but foreseeability is a difficult
concept to define.2 56 The question presented in Halberstam was
whether the murder was a foreseeable act in connection with the
burglary enterprise,2 57 yet the court conveniently avoided the entire
issue of foreseeability with the blanket statement: "[I]t was enough
that [Hamilton] knew [Welch] was involved in some type of personal
property crime at night-whether as a fence, burglar, or armed rob-

252

Id. at 488 ("[A]lthough the amount of assistance Hamilton gave Welch may not have been

overwhelming as to any given burglary in the five-year life of this criminal operation, it added
up over time to an essential part of the pattern." (emphasis in original)).
253 Id.

254 This causal nexus comprises both factual and proximate causation.
255 See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. This result is analogous to the situation in
which a negligent defendant creates a risk of harm and another party does an additional
wrongful act in connection with the risk created. That defendant similarly is responsible for the
negligent or intentional intervening act of another party, so long as the intervening act was
foreseeable. See W. PaossER, supra note 63, at 272-75; McLaughlin, supra note 218, at 175-76.
256 See W. PRossE, supra note 63, at 267 (foreseeability "so completely lacks all clarity and
precision that it amounts to nothing more than a convenient formula").
257 Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 483; RESTATEMENT, supra note 58. The Halberstam court gave
two illustrations from the Restatement in an attempt to clarify the idea of a foreseeable act:
A and B conspire to burglarize C's safe. B, who is the active burglar, after entering
the house and without A's knowledge of his intention to do so, burns the house in
order to conceal the burglary. A is subject to liability to C, not only for the
conversion of the contents of the safe but also for the destruction of the house.
Id., illustration 10. An example of an unforeseeable act by B:
A supplies B with wire cutters to enable B to enter the land of C to recapture chattels
belonging to B, who, as A knows, is not privileged to do this. In the course of the
trespass upon C's land, B intentionally sets fire to C's house. A is not liable for the
destruction of the house.
Id., illustration 11. Compare the ABC example at supra text accompanying note 211. If there is
any distinction between the two examples, it is indeed vague, and offers no analytical guidance
for the future.
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ber made no difference-because violence and killing is a foreseeable
risk in any of these enterprises.

258

At one extreme virtually all events are in some sense foreseeable2 590
2
because even the smallest probabilities are capable of recognition.
The addition of "reasonableness," however, tends to moderate this
view. One source has defined foreseeable consequences as those
" 'which a prudent and experienced person, fully acquainted with the
circumstances which in fact existed .. .would at the time of the...
act have thought reasonably possible ....
.. 21 By ignoring all the

existing circumstances, the Halberstam court abandoned "reasonableness" in their foreseeability analysis.26 2 The court should have considered Hamilton's knowledge of Welch's capabilities, his intentions, his
personality; whether she knew he was armed; and whether the foreseeability of a murder was affected by the passage of time. In sum, all
the existing circumstances should be considered in making a foreseeability determination. Considering the limitless combinations of circumstances which might arise, it seems highly unlikely that a murder
is automatically and indisputably a reasonably foreseeable act in connection with any property crime at night.
D. Conclusion
Generally, it is fundamental that the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof as to causation in a tort action. 26 3 This burden is reduced

258
259
260
261
262

Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488.
See W. PROSSER, supra note 63, at 267.
Id.
Id. at 268 n.63 (quoting Butts v. Anthis, 181 Okla. 276, 73 P.2d 843 (1937)).
Much confusion surrounds the foreseeability limitation. One legitimate criticism of the

foreseeability standard is that, ultimately, foreseeability depends on the specificity used in
describing the event. See Morris, Proximate Cause in Minnesota, 34 MINN. L. REV. 185, 192-94
(1950); Morris, On the Teaching of Legal Cause, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1102 (1939). Other
courts have stretched the concept much farther than Halberstain. See, e.g.. Jackson v. Utica
Light & Power Co., 64 Cal. App. 2d 885, 149 P.2d 748 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (foreseeable that
defendant's high voltage power lines would be subjected to strain, break, and fall upon telephone
wires contacting power shovel and electrocuting plaintiff); In re Guardian Casualty Co., 253
A.D. 360, 2 N.Y.S.2d 232 (App. Div. 1938) (collision between taxicab and automobile held to be
proximate cause of death occurring 20 minutes later when woman was struck by dislodged stone
which fell when taxicab was being removed from building); Byrnes v. Stephens, 349 S.W.2d 611
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (foreseeable that drunk driver would hit appellant's negligently parked
truck pushing it forward and crushing appellee between truck and parked car); Hines v.
Morrow, 236 S.W. 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (when assisting in towing car out of mud on
defendant's negligently maintained road, plaintiff gets wooden leg stuck in hole and simultaneously entangles good leg in tow rope so that good leg is injured requiring amputation).
263 See W. PROSSER, supra note 63, at 236.
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substantially by the theory of civil conspiracy, and by the Halberstam
application of aiding-abetting. The principles of causation place reasonable limits upon responsibility. When these principles are ignored,
consistency in the law deteriorates, precedent becomes useless, and
each court may conform the law to its own subjective sense of justice.
The first inquiry in applying either theory should be whether the
defendant's conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's harm. The
"but for" test thus remains useful as a means of excluding conduct
which was not a necessary antecedent of the plaintiff's injury.26 4 The
substantial factor test adopted by the Restatement also may provide a
helpful approach: Was the defendant's26 5conduct a substantial factor in
bringing about harm to the plaintiff?
After causation in fact has been established, the legal question of
proximate cause can be approached. 26 6 In aiding-abetting, the subjective influences on determinations of substantial assistance cannot be
eliminated completely, but perhaps more objectivity will result if the
contributing factors are viewed with the understanding that the test is
essentially one of legal causation.
The substantial assistance test should be applied to civil conspiracies as well as to aiding-abetting. One can ask whether a conspirator
substantially assisted or encouraged an act of a co-conspirator; hence,
the agreement becomes one factor to be considered in determining
substantial assistance. If the party did not "substantially assist," then
he should not be held liable. The mere fact that it is more likely than
not that an unlawful agreement existed should not change this result.
Altering the theory of civil conspiracy by the addition of the substantial assistance test is one way to preserve the principles of legal causation.
It should be emphasized that aiding-abetting and civil conspiracy
will apply concurrently to many situations.26 7 The extension of liability in the two theories, therefore, should be consistent. In order to
achieve this consistency, civil conspiracy liability should be limited to
264 See H. HART & A. HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 85 (1959); McLaughlin, supra note
218, at 153 ("By causation in fact, we here mean causation sine qua non, that is, if the harm
would not have happened but for the act, the act in fact caused the damage.").
26 See supra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
266 See supra note 229.
267 See, e.g., Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 472; American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grim, 201 Kan.
340, 440 P.2d 621 (1968) (four minors illegally enter church; two boys, unknown to other two,
use torches for lighting; church sustains fire damage); Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166,
183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (one party sells professional model's picture to another party who
alters picture and libels model); Keel, 331 P.2d at 397 (plaintiff injured by blackboard eraser
thrown during classroom horseplay).
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consequences which are reasonably foreseeable within the common
scheme of the underlying agreement.
Many policy considerations enter into the determination of proximate causation. Deterrence, punishment, and compensation are all
legitimate goals. Economic compensation for victims of crime is certainly a goal which may justify placing the loss upon one who intentionally breaches a duty rather than on an innocent plaintiff,2 6 8 but
punitive damages are directed toward punishment 6 9 and deterrence. 270 When the substantial factor test is ignored and foreseeability
does not limit the defendant's responsibility for the acts of another, the
causal link between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's harm is
so tenuous that a preponderence of the evidence cannot justify punishment or deterrence. 27' In cases of conspiracy, the goals of deterrence
and punishment are better left to criminal law, where the problems of
causal tenuity are better handled by proofs beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Markham R. Leventhal

2" See W. PaossEn, supra note 63, at 263; see also Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 489.
269 W. PnossER, supra note 63, at 9; Walther & Plein, Punitive Damages: A CriticalAnalysis:

Kink v. Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 369, 371 (1965).
270 W. PRossEm, supra note 63, at 9, 11; Walther & Plein, supra note 269, at 372-73.
271 For a discussion on the functional relationships between various causal concepts and the
possible goals of tort law, see Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for
Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975).

